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Introduction
In 1979, the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Maryland1 that
individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
telephone numbers they dial.2 So the Fourth Amendment did not apply
when the government requested that Smith’s telephone company use a
pen register to record all of the outgoing numbers dialed from his
phone.3 The Court justified its decision by emphasizing that pen reg–
isters were simple mechanical devices with limited functions, recording
only the telephone numbers dialed from the particular landline to which
a register was attached.4
But today, pen registers are not so limited. In fact, the term no
longer refers to a particular device but to any “device or process which
records or decodes dialing . . . information,”5 including outgoing tele–
phone numbers, the date, time, and length of calls.6 Even in 1979, it
1.

442 U.S. 735 (1979).

2.

Id. at 745–46.

3.

Id.

4.

Id. at 741–43.

5.

18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012).

6.

See John T. Nockleby, Privacy in Cyberspace: Modules I & IV, Harv. L.
Sch.: Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y (2002), https://cyber.harvard

489

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
The Erosion of Smith v. Maryland

was easy to infer private information from a list of telephone numbers
because “phone numbers are unique to their owners.”7 Simply by using
a telephone directory, phone numbers can be matched to their owners
to reveal who a person was calling. The receiving party could be a
friend, an addiction resource hotline, a church, or a political organ–
ization. And by identifying each of these recipients, private information
can be inferred about the caller.8 These limited inferences mean that
telephone numbers are not just telephone numbers as the Smith Court
suggested. This is even more true today. With the development of
inexpensive data storage and datamining technology, the inferences to
be drawn from aggregated telephony metadata can often serve as a costeffective proxy for the content of the conversations themselves.9
In Carpenter v. United States,10 the Supreme Court recognized the
threat to privacy posed when the government is permitted to amass
and analyze large amounts of metadata about an individual.11 It held
that the Fourth Amendment applies when the government seeks to
acquire at least one week’s worth of an individual’s cell site location
information (“CSLI”)12—location metadata automatically generated by
dint of a cell phone’s operation and stored by cell-service providers for
business purposes.13 The analysis in Carpenter marks a shift in the
Court’s understanding of how the Fourth Amendment applies in the
context of digital metadata to protect against “too permeating police
surveillance.”14
Although aggregated telephony and location metadata can often be
analyzed to yield similar (if not the same) private information, the

.edu/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/XJS3-MHYX].
7.

Supplemental Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten at 2, ACLU v.
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-3994).

8.

Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten at 14, ACLU, 959 F. Supp.
2d 724 (No. 13-3994).

9.

Id. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court
established that the contents of an individual’s private conversation are
subject to the Fourth Amendment’s protection: “The Government’s
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 353.

10.

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).

11.

Id. at 2217–18.

12.

Id. at 2217 n.3, 2220.

13.

Id. at 2211–12.

14.

Id. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
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Supreme Court insists that Smith is still good law.15 This Comment
analyzes how, despite the Court’s protestations, technological develop–
ments and changes in the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, as illustrated by Carpenter, have undermined and eroded
the reasoning on which Smith was founded. Part I provides a detailed
overview of the facts and the majority and dissenting opinions of Smith
v. Maryland. Part II describes how the technology surrounding the
acquisition and use of telephony metadata has changed in the forty
years since Smith was decided and compares the Court’s reasoning in
Carpenter and Smith. Allowing the government unfettered access to
telephony metadata in 1979 had drastically different privacy impli–
cations than allowing that same access today. Therefore, this Comment
concludes that the same protections provided to CSLI in Carpenter
should be extended to Smith’s telephony metadata.

I. Smith v. Maryland
A. The Facts

In 1976, as Patricia McDonough was walking home late one night,
she passed a man changing a tire on his 1975 Chevrolet Monte Carlo.16
As she neared her home, the man grabbed her from behind and forcibly
took her wallet, which contained her name and address.17 During the
struggle, McDonough got a “full-face view of the robber.”18 When the
man fled, she reported the incident to the police, providing a description
of both her attacker and the Monte Carlo.19
Shortly after the robbery, McDonough began receiving “threatening
and obscene” phone calls on her landline from a man identifying himself
as her attacker.20 During one such call, the caller told McDonough to
step outside her house.21 Upon doing so, she recognized the Monte Carlo
she had observed at the robbery “moving slowly past her home.”22 She
reported these calls to the police and, with the help of a friend, installed
a recording device and recorded three or four of the calls.23
15.

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (emphasizing that its decision there
“do[es] not disturb the application of Smith”).

16.

Smith v. Maryland, 389 A.2d 858, 859 (Md. 1978).

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).

20.

Id.

21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Smith, 389 A.2d at 859.
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Eleven days after the robbery, Michael Smith stopped a police
officer in the general vicinity of McDonough’s home and asked for help
“opening the locked door of his 1975 Monte Carlo.”24 The officer who
Smith stopped happened to be the same officer who had taken
McDonough’s statement following the robbery.25 Recognizing the car
that McDonough had described to him, the officer recorded the vehicle’s
license plate number.26 When he ran the plate number, he discovered
that the Monte Carlo was registered to Smith and identified Smith’s
telephone number.27
At the police’s request, the telephone company installed “a pen
register at its central offices to record the numbers dialed from the
telephone at [Smith’s] home.”28 The pen register—“a mechanical device
that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the
electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released”29—recorded all of the outgoing numbers from Smith’s phone
but it did not record whether those calls were completed.30 The pen
register revealed that a call was placed from Smith’s home phone to
McDonough’s residence.31 Based on this evidence, the police secured a
warrant to search Smith’s home; during that search, they seized a phone
book.32 The page on which McDonough’s telephone number appeared
had been dog eared.33 Smith was arrested and McDonough identified
him in a lineup as the robber.34
Smith was indicted for robbery.35 After his suppression motion was
denied, “[t]he pen register tape . . . and the phone book” were admitted

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.

28.

Id.

29.

Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161
n.1 (1977)). The Court went on to explain that “[a] pen register is ‘usually
installed at a central telephone facility [and] records on a paper tape all
numbers dialed from [the] line’ to which it is attached.” Id. (alterations
in original) (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

30.

Brief of Petitioner at 5, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (No. 785374), 1979 WL 214031, at *5.

31.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

Id.

35.

Id.
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into evidence.36 Smith was convicted and sentenced to six years in
prison.37 The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that “there
is no constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in the
numbers dialed into a telephone system and hence no search within the
[F]ourth [A]mendment is implicated by the use of a pen register instal–
led at the central offices of the telephone company.”38
B. The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion

On appeal, Smith asked the Supreme Court of the United States to
consider “whether the installation and use of a pen register” to reveal
the outgoing telephone numbers dialed from the landline in Smith’s
home “constitute[d] a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”39 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun answered
with a resounding no.40
While acknowledging the traditional property-based conception of
the Fourth Amendment,41 Justice Blackmun explained that when
“determining whether a particular form of government-initiated elec–
tronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, [the] lodestar is Katz v. United States.”42 In Katz, the
Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require–
ment applied when FBI agents attached an electronic listening device
to the exterior of a phone booth to record the conversations Katz
carried on inside.43 While not replacing the traditional property-based
conception of the Fourth Amendment,44 the Katz Court held that the
Fourth Amendment applies when a government invasion “violate[s] the
36.

Id. at 737–38.

37.

Id. at 738.

38.

Smith v. Maryland, 389 A.2d 858, 867 (Md. 1978).

39.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 736.

40.

Id. at 736, 745–46.

41.

Id. at 739. Under the property-based conception of the Fourth Amendment,
the Fourth Amendment applies where the government intrudes on a
constitutionally protected area with the intent to find something. Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94 (1914); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012). In Smith, Justice Blackmun concluded that the
property-based test did not apply to Smith’s case because the information
was acquired through a pen register located on the telephone company’s
property and thus, involved no physical intrusion into Smith’s home.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.

42.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 739 (footnote omitted).

43.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348–50 (1967).

44.

See Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test.”).
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privacy upon which [an individual] justifiably relied.”45 Justice Harlan,
in his concurrence, understood the majority’s language to require both
that the individual “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy” and “that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”46 This two-prong analysis has been adopted
by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases, including Smith.47
In Smith, though purporting to apply Justice Harlan’s Katz
analysis, the Court first asked, not whether Smith himself exhibited “an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” but whether a reasonable
person would “entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial.”48 This apparent misapplication of Katz’s subjective
prong likely stems from an inherent problem with the subjective inquiry
itself: the only person who has knowledge of an individual’s subjective
belief is that individual; for everyone else, subjective belief can only be
divined through guesswork.49 The Court attempted to circumvent this
conundrum by assuming that if a reasonable person would not have
believed something, odds are that the individual in question did not
believe it either.50
In applying its modified subjective inquiry, the Court assumed that
“[a]ll telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to
the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switch–
ing equipment that their calls are completed” and that “[a]ll subscribers
realize . . . that the phone company has facilities for making permanent
records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance
(toll) calls on their monthly bills.”51 The Court also observed that
“[m]ost phone books tell subscribers, on a page entitled ‘Customer
Information,’ that the company ‘can frequently help in identifying to
the authorities the origin of unwelcome and troublesome calls.’”52

45.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.

46.

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

47.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 740–41; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (“Our later
cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
[Katz] . . . .”); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).

48.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, 742.

49.

See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 2.1(c) (5th ed. 2012).

50.

See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.

51.

Id. at 742. It is worth noting that the telephone in Smith’s residence was
listed to his father and Smith may not have been the “subscriber” to whom
monthly bills were sent. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 30, at 5.

52.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43 (quoting Baltimore Phone Directory 21
(1978)).
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Based on these observations and assumptions, the Court concluded
that a reasonable person would know that telephone numbers must be
communicated to a telephone company to complete a call and that the
telephone companies have the ability—by means of pen registers or
otherwise—to record those numbers.53 As such, “[a]lthough subjective
expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it [was] too much [for the
Court] to believe that telephone subscribers . . . harbor any general
expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”54
Next, the Court asked, assuming Smith did have a subjective
expectation of privacy, whether that expectation was “one that society
[was] prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”55 In concluding that any
subjective expectation of privacy Smith might have was not one that
society was prepared to accept, the Court relied exclusively on the
third-party doctrine.56
The Smith Court explained that under the third-party doctrine, “a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”57 It reasoned that by dialing
McDonough’s telephone number, Smith assumed the risk that the
telephone company—a third-party—would make public the numbers
that he dialed.58 The Court noted that exposing information to
electronic equipment, such as the telephone company’s switchboard,
implicated the third-party doctrine just as much as if Smith had placed
his call with a human third party; that is, with the assistance of a
telephone operator.59 Furthermore, the Court held that the third-party
doctrine applies equally to information communicated to a third party,
whether or not that party routinely makes records preserving those
communications.60
In sum, the Court held that Smith could satisfy neither prong of
the Katz test. As such, the Fourth Amendment’s protection did not
apply and the Government was within its rights to obtain via a pen
register—and without a warrant—the telephone numbers that Smith
dialed from his home’s landline.61

53.

Id. at 743.

54.

Id.

55.

Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).

56.

Id. at 743–44.

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 744.

59.

Id. at 744–45.

60.

Id. at 745.

61.

Id. at 745–46.
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C. The Supreme Court Dissenting Opinions

Eight Justices considered Smith’s case.62 While Justices Burger,
White, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined Justice Blackmun’s majority,
Justice Stewart and Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, filed
dissenting opinions.63 The dissenters argued that the telephone numbers
an individual dials reveal intimate information about the caller and
should be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.64 And both
took issue with the majority’s application of the third-party doctrine,
though for different reasons.
1. Justice Stewart

The crux of Justice Stewart’s dissent was that the majority’s
analysis was contrary to the holding in Katz. He noted that, in Katz,
the Court observed “the vital role that the public telephone has come
to play in private communication[s]”65 and that, at the time Smith was
decided, the private telephone had become just as vital.66 On that basis,
the Katz Court held that using electronic surveillance equipment to
intercept the contents of an individual’s telephonic communications
constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.67 But to complete a
telephone call, not only must the caller expose to the telephone
company’s electronic equipment the number she dials, but she must
also expose the content of her conversation.68 To Justice Stewart, it was
incongruous to hold that the caller must assume the risk that her
telephone company might disclose to the government only the telephone
numbers she dials and not the contents of her conversation.69
He rejected the majority’s notion that the government’s collection
of dialed telephone numbers was more innocuous than its collection of
the content of conversations.70 He noted that “[m]ost private telephone
subscribers may have their own numbers listed in a publicly distributed
directory.”71 By cross-referencing the numbers an individual dials, the
62.

Justice Powell took no part in the decision. Id. at 746.

63.

Id. at 736.

64.

See id. at 747–48 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 748–49 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

65.

Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)).

66.

Id.

67.

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53.

68.

Smith, 442 U.S. at 746–47 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

69.

Id. at 746–47.

70.

Id. at 747–48.

71.

Id. at 748.
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government “easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the
places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person’s
life.”72
2. Justice Marshall

Justice Marshall, like Justice Stewart, believed that telephone
numbers can reveal intimate information about the person who dials
them. He observed that it is not only criminals who value their privacy
when making calls.73 For example, “[m]any individuals, including
members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with confid–
ential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of their
personal contacts.”74 He concluded that government “access to tele–
phone records on less than probable cause may . . . impede certain
forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the
hallmark of a truly free society.”75
But, unlike Justice Stewart, Justice Marshall did not focus on the
conflict between the majority’s reasoning and Katz. Instead, he
attacked the assumptions upon which the majority’s subjective analysis
rested, identifying two fundamental flaws with the third-party
doctrine.76
Unlike the majority, Justice Marshall did not believe that it was
reasonable to expect individuals to “infer from the long-distance listings
on their phone bills, and from the cryptic assurances of ‘help’ in tracing
obscene calls included in ‘most’ phone books, that pen registers are
regularly used for recording local calls.”77 He reasoned that, even if
individuals were aware that telephone companies monitor the calls they
make, “it does not follow that they expect this information to be made
available to the public in general or the government in particular.”78
Justice Marshall also believed that the third-party doctrine is
“misconceived in two critical respects.”79 First, he argued that for an
individual to have assumed a risk by his or her action (e.g., dialing a
72.

Id.

73.

Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 749–51.

77.

Id. at 748–49. Justice Marshall was clearly skeptical that most individuals
(with the possible exception of Justice Blackmun) would be inclined to
read their phone books thoroughly enough to be familiar with the
“Consumer Information” page notifying customers that telephone companies
can help track obscene calls. See id.

78.

Id. at 749.

79.

Id.
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number), the individual must have a meaningful choice whether to
perform that action.80 He observed the vital role that telephones have
come to play in modern society and the fact that an individual must
convey a telephone number to his or her telephone company in order
to complete a call.81 As such, he believed that an individual’s choice to
convey a number to his or her telephone company was not meaningful
because the only alternative was to “forgo use of what for many has
become a personal or professional necessity.”82 Thus, “as a practical
matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.”83
Second, he argued that “to make risk analysis dispositive in
assessing the reasonableness of privacy expectations would allow the
government to define the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.”84
He believed that the government should not be able to dictate the scope
of the Fourth Amendment’s protection.85 In his view, the third-party
doctrine would allow the government to avoid the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement “simply by announcing their intent to monitor the
content of random samples of first-class mail or private phone conver–
sations.”86
In lieu of the third-party doctrine, Justice Marshall suggested an
alternative test for determining whether an individual’s expectation of
privacy was one that society was prepared to accept: not whether an
individual assumed the risk of disclosure by communicating information
to a third party, but whether an individual “should be forced to assume
[a particular risk] in a free and open society.”87 To answer this question,
he believed that “courts must evaluate the ‘intrinsic character’ of
investigative practices with reference to the basic values underlying the
Fourth Amendment.”88 Marshall believed that privacy is not “possessed
absolutely or not at all.”89 While his proposed inquiry represented a
sharp deviation from the third-party doctrine’s bright-line rule, he

80.

Id.

81.

Id. at 749–50.

82.

Id. at 750.

83.

Id.

84.

Id.

85.

Id. at 751.

86.

Id. at 750.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 751 (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 94 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).

89.

Id. at 749.
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argued that the vaguer standard might accommodate individuals’
varying degrees of privacy.90

II. The Eroding Basis of Smith
In Carpenter v. United States,91 the Supreme Court held that
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of
their physical location as revealed by their historical CSLI—the
metadata automatically generated and stored by cellular service
companies every time a cell phone user makes a call.92 Carpenter is the
first Supreme Court case since Smith was decided in 1979 to consider
how the Fourth Amendment applies to third-party-maintained meta–
data.93 The two holdings reached starkly different conclusions regarding
whether these different types of metadata qualify for Fourth
Amendment protection.
This Part compares the analyses in Smith and Katz to that in
Carpenter, identifying how the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
analysis has evolved to keep pace with the technological advancements
over the last forty years (since Smith was decided). Though the
Carpenter Court insisted that its decision did not overturn Smith,
Carpenter suggests that while short-term use of a pen register may
remain outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, long-term surveil–
lance implicates its protection.
A. The Subjective Expectation

In Katz, the majority held that the government’s use of an
electronic listening device attached to the outside of a public telephone
booth “violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied.”94 This
language can be read (as Justice Harlan seemed to suggest in his
concurrence95) to require that an individual harbor a subjective
90.

Id. at 750–51.

91.

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).

92.

Id. at 2219–20; see also Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone
Surveillance Still Doesn’t Require a Warrant, The Atlantic (Apr. 14,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/sixthcircuit-cellphone-tracking-csli-warrant/478197/ [https://perma.cc/YBL5ZHHV]. CSLI is also generated when cell phones are used for other
purposes, including sending a text message, using an app, or getting a
push notification. Id.

93.

See Stephen E. Henderson, Carpenter v. United States and the Fourth
Amendment: The Best Way Forward, 26 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J.
495, 504 (2017).

94.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).

95.

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“a person [must] have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”).
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expectation of privacy to qualify for Fourth Amendment protection.
But many commentators have questioned whether the majority’s
opinion truly requires or should require consideration of an individual’s
subjective expectations.96
Orin Kerr has argued that the subjective requirement, as originally
conceived by Justice Harlan, played the role of what we think of today
as an objective consideration: the third-party doctrine.97 According to
Kerr, Harlan left an interpretational clue by claiming that his two-part
analysis was an “understanding of the [majority’s] rule
that . . . emerged from prior decisions.”98 While Harlan did not give
examples of these prior cases, two lines of Fourth Amendment search
cases were prevalent when Katz was decided: “protected-area cases,
which identified the spaces that could receive Fourth Amendment
protection”; and “voluntary exposure” cases, in which individuals were
deemed to have relinquished Fourth Amendment protection by either
exposing their protected areas to public view or inviting a government
agent into those areas.99 Against this background, Kerr posited that
Harlan’s objective requirement stemmed from the protected-area cases,
while his subjective requirement emerged from the voluntary-exposure
cases100:
As originally intended, the two parts of Harlan’s test each did
independent work. The objective test asked whether the nature
of the space invaded by the government was one that society was
willing to recognize as private. On the other hand, the subjective
test asked whether the individual took steps to make objectively
protected spaces open to outside observation and thus yielded
privacy rights against that invited observation.101

But in the 1970s and 1980s, a doctrinal shift occurred: the Supreme
Court began analyzing issues of voluntary-exposure from an objective
standpoint and replaced the original subjective standard with a “purely
subjective standard.”102 That reinterpretation, however, has rendered

96.

LaFave, supra note 49.

97.

Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective
Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 113, 113, 115 (2015).

98.

Id. at 124 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

99.

Id. at 124–26.

100. Id. at 126.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 114, 128–30. Although some courts still “requir[e] a person to ‘exhibit’
or ‘manifest’ an expectation of privacy,” that requirement is now
duplicative of the third-party doctrine. See id. at 130–31.
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the subjective requirement virtually functionless.103 While a minority of
courts applying the subjective standard retain Justice Harlan’s original
formulation—requiring that “a person . . . ‘exhibit’ or ‘manifest’ an
expectation of privacy”104—this analysis has now been made redundant
by the third-party doctrine.105
The subjective requirement also lacks any outcome-determinative
effect when applied as a “purely subjective standard.”106 The Supreme
Court has acknowledged that, if the Fourth Amendment protected only
individuals who subjectively expected privacy, then the government
could thwart the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement by simply
conditioning individuals to never expect privacy.107 For example, by
announcing that the National Security Agency is secretly collecting
cellphone metadata about citizens, the government’s collection of those
records would fall outside of the Fourth Amendment’s scope because
individuals could no longer retain a subjective expectation of privacy.
Even in those cases where government action has not altered the scope
of an individual’s subjective expectations, the court is faced with the
further problem of attempting to divine purely subjective expectations,
which inherently can only be truly known by the individual in
question.108
The Smith Court, interpreting the subjective element as a purely
subjective standard, attempted to determine Smith’s subjective expect–
ation of privacy by assessing whether a reasonable person generally
“entertain[s] any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers [she]
dial[s].”109 Ultimately, it determined that people—and Smith by
proxy—generally do not subjectively entertain such an expectation.110
But this determination was not outcome-determinative because the
Court also found that “even if [Smith] did harbor some subjective
expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private,

103. Id. at 131–33; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979); Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984) (emphasizing the importance of
the objective element over the subjective).
104. Kerr, supra note 97, at 130.
105. Id. at 130–31.
106. See id. at 131.
107. See id. at 132–33; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5; Hudson, 468 U.S.
at 525 n.7.
108. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (assessing what a reasonable person might
have thought were Smith’s subjective expectations and admitting that
“subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged”).
109. Id. at 742. The Court seemingly ignored the possibility that Smith was
not a reasonable person.
110. Id.
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this expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as
“reasonable.”’”111
Due to these deficiencies, the subjective requirement has largely
become a “phantom doctrine.”112 An empirical study of all 2012
Westlaw-reported cases that purported to use the Katz test revealed
that fifty-seven percent of those cases did not mention the subjective
test.113 Of those that did, only twelve percent actually applied the test,
and in no case was the subjective test outcome determinative.114
This phasing-out of the subjective requirement is reflected in recent
Supreme Court cases.115 For example, in Carpenter, the Court quoted
Smith’s understanding of the Katz test, explaining that a governmental
intrusion qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search when “an individual
‘seeks to preserve something as private,’ and his expectation of privacy
is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”116 But
despite reciting the traditional standard, the Court engaged in no
subjective analysis.117 These cases suggest that the Supreme Court,
while frequently reciting Harlan’s two-step formulation of the Katz test,
has abandoned the subjective requirement. As such, a person’s
subjective expectations are not relevant to the contemporary under–
standing of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.118
111. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
112. Kerr, supra note 97, at 114–15.
113. Id. at 114.
114. Id.
115. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32–35 (2001) (reciting the two
prongs of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, but applying only
the objective prong); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 422–23 (Alito, J., concurring); Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (declaring simply that “the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’” and not
mentioning the subjective requirement).
116. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Smith,
442 U.S. at 740).
117. Id. at 2213–14.
118. Even if the Smith Court’s understanding of the subjective element is still
valid, the factual bases for the Court’s decision—(1) monthly phone bills
contain a list of long-distance numbers dialed; and (2) phone books contain a
“customer information” page notifying customers that telephone companies
can help identify troublesome callers—are no longer true. See Smith, 442
U.S. at 742–43.
Today, more than half of U.S. homes do not have landlines. Tracey Lien,
More Than Half of U.S. Households Have Ditched Landline Phones, L.A.
Times (June 6, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/lafi-tn-landline-cellphone-20180606-story.html [https://perma.cc/9DPDL6Y4]. More than 53.9% of households now rely exclusively on cell-phone
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B. The Objective Expectation
1. The Nature of the Challenged Activity

In Smith, the Court held that “even if [Smith] did harbor some
subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain
private, this expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize
as “reasonable.”’”119 In coming to this conclusion, the Court explained
that the Katz analysis must “begin by specifying precisely the nature
of the state activity that is challenged.”120 In Smith, that activity was
the installation and use of a pen register.121 Early pen registers were
mechanical devices that could be attached to a particular telephone line
in a telephone company’s central offices.122 Whenever dial pulses passed
through the line, the pen register would automatically record the dialed
numbers as dashes on paper tape.123 The functions of the pen register
in Smith—based on the Court’s opinion—seem to have been quite
limited, recording only the telephone numbers dialed without revealing
any other identifying information.124 The Court found this functional
limitation significant:
service, and that number is climbing. Id. And most cell-phone bills do not
contain a list of numbers the user has dialed over the preceding month.
See, e.g., Current Customers: Learn About Your Monthly Bill, Sprint
https://www.sprint.com/en/support/solutions/account-and-billing/tutorialmonthly-bill.html [https://perma.cc/Z7EK-JMWD]; Introducing Your
New AT&T Bill, AT&T, https://www.att.com/ecms/dam/att/consumer/
help/pdf/Wireless-Sample-Bill-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8U4-L2FX].
This shift means that most Americans no longer receive a monthly
reminder that their cell-phone-service providers are recording their
telephony metadata. Furthermore, the accessibility of information online
has rendered phone books a relic of the past. In 2019, the iconic Yellow
Pages stopped printing. The company hoped that the final editions,
printed in 2018, would become “souvenirs.” Patrick Greenfield, Yellow
Pages to Stop Printing from January 2019, The Guardian (Sept. 1,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/sep/01/yellow-pagesto-stop-printing-from-january-2019 [https://perma.cc/H676-KVHC].
Because a reasonable person in today’s society would not have access to
the same information that an individual might have possessed in 1979, it
is questionable whether the Court’s subjective analysis in Smith remains
applicable.
119. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
120. Id. at 741.
121. Id.
122. William A. Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 Drake L. Rev. 108, 109
(1970).
123. Id. at 110.
124. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
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[A] pen register differs significantly from the listening device
employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of
communications. . . . “Indeed, a law enforcement official could
not even determine from the use of a pen register whether a
communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed—a
means of establishing communication. Neither the purport of any
communication between the caller and the recipient of the call,
their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is
disclosed by pen registers.”125

Today’s pen registers, however, are not so limited. The term no
longer describes a mechanical device attached to a land line. Instead,
pen register has come to mean any device or process that records
information similar to that recordable by traditional pen registers.126 In
addition to the telephone numbers called from a particular phone,
contemporary pen registers also record the date, time, and length of
calls.127 This information is already gathered by telephone companies
for their own business purposes, making its production relatively easy.128
The development of ancillary technologies like inexpensive data
storage129 and data mining130 also challenges the Smith Court’s assertion
that the content of communications is deserving of Fourth Amendment
protection while metadata is not. The Court recognized those
developments in Carpenter. There, the state activity at issue was the
government’s warrantless acquisition of Carpenter’s historical CSLI,
data “that provide[d] a comprehensive chronicle of [his] past move–
ments.”131 Like telephone numbers, CSLI is composed of metadata. As
such, CSLI is not just a collection of points plotted onto a map, but it
includes, among other things, the identification number associated with
the radio antenna the phone connected to (“Cell ID”), the date and
time the connection was made, and the telephone number or numbers

125. Id. (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012) (defining pen register as “a device or
process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire
or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such
information shall not include the contents of any communication”).
127. See Nockleby, supra note 6.
128. See id.
129. See Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the
NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State 151–53 (2014).
130. See Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal
Framework, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435, 435–36 (2008).
131. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
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involved.132 By analyzing this metadata, an individual’s location can be
inferred.133
But the Carpenter Court did not hold that Carpenter had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his discrete CSLI records. Rather,
it held that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI
records aggregated over the course of seven days or more.134 This focus
on aggregated metadata versus discrete data points is a response to the
aggregation problem: the fact that when metadata is amassed in
sufficient quantities it can be analyzed by computer programs to reveal
“useful correlations within data sets not capable of analysis by ordinary
human assessment.”135
The information that can be gleaned from these correlations can
act as a proxy for content.136 From the patterns and sequences in which
“calls occur, when they occur, how often they occur, and between which
numbers,”137 an individual’s habits can be revealed and his social
network mapped:
Calling patterns can reveal when we are awake and asleep; our
religion, if a person regularly makes no calls on the Sabbath, or
makes a large number of calls on Christmas Day; our work habits
and our social aptitude; the number of friends we have; and even
our civil and political affiliations.138

Some analysts have discovered correlations between callers’ relative
power and social statuses based on the time it takes for the parties to
call each other back and at what times they call.139
Obtaining information through metadata analysis is often far easier
and less expensive than it would be to obtain the same information by
way of content because metadata is structured by nature,140 allowing it
132. Matthew Tart et al., Historic Cell Site Analysis—Overview of Principles
and Survey Methodologies, 8 Digital Investigation 185, 185 (2012).
133. Id.
134. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.
135. Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth
Amendment, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 35, 42 (2014); see also Emily Berman,
When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 Minn. L.
Rev. 577, 579 (2017); Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra
note 8, at 8.
136. Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 8, at 14.
137. Id. at 9–10 (quoting Pen-Link Ltd., Unique Features of Pen-Link
v8, at 5 (2008)).
138. Id. at 16.
139. See id. at 17.
140. See id. at 7–8.

505

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
The Erosion of Smith v. Maryland

to be inexpensively stored and efficiently analyzed.141 By contrast,
human speech is relatively unstructured and its analysis must take into
account factors including language, dialect, social customs, and speech
impediments.142 These factors make it functionally impossible for anal–
ysts to analyze content on a large scale.143
So why was the Smith Court not concerned about the aggregation
problem? Most likely because computer analysis of huge datasets was
not possible before digital storage became economical.144 In 1972, half a
megabyte of memory—500,000 bytes—could cost as much as $100,000
or $613,775.12 today when adjusted for inflation.145 This means that
one byte of memory—which can store about one character, e.g., ‘A,’
‘$,’ or ‘1’146—would have cost $1.22 in today’s dollars.147 So, in 1972, the
amount of memory needed to store a ten-digit phone number would
have cost about $2.00 (about $12.00 today). By comparison, one
terabyte—one trillion bytes—of memory can be purchased on Amazon
for $19.99148—enough memory to store 100 billion ten-digit telephone
numbers.149
Though both Carpenter and Smith considered the government’s
acquisition of telephony metadata, the Courts reached the opposite
conclusion on whether the Fourth Amendment applies.150 The Smith
141. Id. at 8.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 7–8, 11.
144. Id. at 8.
145. See Three-Seventy Leasing Corp. v. Ampex Corp., 528 F.2d 993, 995,
996 n.2 (5th Cir. 1976); U.S. Inflation Calculator, https://www.
usinflationcalculator.com [https://perma.cc/MNE3-3ST5] (last updated
Dec. 11, 2019).
146. CS101 Introduction to Computing Principles: Bits and Bytes, Stan. U.,
https://web.stanford.edu/class/cs101/bits-bytes.html [https://perma.cc/
4TDE-DFDY] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
147. See U.S. Inflation Calculator, supra note 145.
148. 1 TB USB Flash Drive Memory Stick for Laptop/PC/Computer, Amazon,
https://www.amazon.com/Flash-Memory-Rotatable-Laptop-Computer/
dp/B07NY9WR28/ref=sr_1_4?keywords=terabyte+flash+drive&qid=1
570049813&sr=8-4 [https://perma.cc/A4W6-V7H2] (last visited Dec. 31,
2019).
149. See Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 8, at 5–6
(calculating that it would take approximately fifty terabytes annually to
store all U.S.-generated call records).
150. Compare Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018)
(“[W]hen the Government accessed CSLI from the wireless carriers, it
invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his
physical movements.”), with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46
(1979) (“[Smith] in all probability entertained no actual expectation of

506

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
The Erosion of Smith v. Maryland

Court viewed telephone numbers in isolation;151 the Carpenter Court
focused not only on the numbers that constitute CSLI, but also on what
those numbers mean in the context of technological innovations.152 The
Carpenter Court noted that intimate information that one might expect
to keep private can be inferred from CSLI analysis, including a person’s
“familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”153
These same privacies can be inferred from the aggregated telephony
metadata gathered by a pen register.154 And the Carpenter Court
believed that the threat to privacy posed by CSLI datamining was
exacerbated by the fact that the use of this technology is both practical
and economical.155 Again, datamining telephony bears the same hall–
marks.
The way Carpenter described the nature of CSLI shows that the
Court’s view of metadata has changed in two significant ways. First,
metadata should not be viewed in isolation, but in the context of other
technological innovations that analysts use to infer the private details
of an individual’s life. For example, rather than looking only at the
information collected and the direct means of its collection (e.g.,
telephone numbers collected by a pen register), the Court must widen
its focus to consider ancillary technologies, such as the government’s
ability to manipulate that metadata after its acquisition by using
privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and . . . if he did, his expectation
was not ‘legitimate.’ The installation and use of a pen register, consequently,
was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.”).
151. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
152. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12, 2216–17.
153. Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)). By rejecting the government’s contention
that CSLI did not infringe on Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of
privacy because that data did “not on their own suffice to place
[Carpenter] at the crime scene,” the Court reminded us that, in Kyllo, it
had rejected the proposition that “inference insulates a search.” Id. at
2218 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 n.4 (2001)). Stated
differently, information from which intimate inferences can be drawn is
not immune to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement solely
because the information itself reveals no intimate information if that
inference is never drawn.
154. See Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 8, at 14, 20.
The logic underlying the inference is simply different. Just as “individuals
often go to particular locations for particular purposes,” Brief of Technology
Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 29, Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402) (emphasis omitted), “certain
telephone numbers are used for a single purpose,” Declaration of Professor
Edward W. Felten, supra note 8, at 14.
155. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18; see also Brief of Technology Experts,
supra note 154, at 28–29.
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datamining programs. Second, even if privacy concerns are not
implicated by the government’s acquisition of discrete pieces of
metadata, they may be implicated by that data’s aggregation over
time.156 Viewed through these lenses, allowing the government to collect
telephone numbers without judicial oversight has very different privacy
implications today than it did in 1979.
It is unlikely, in light of Carpenter, that the Court would find an
expectation of privacy in discrete telephone numbers dialed from a
particular phone. But the threat to privacy posed by the aggregation
problem regarding both CSLI and telephony metadata indicates that
the Fourth Amendment should impose a limit on the long-term use of
pen registers to collect telephony metadata.
2. The Third-Party Doctrine

The Smith Court held that, despite the intimate nature of the
information the government acquires, that information is not protected
by the Fourth Amendment if the third-party doctrine is implicated.157
The Court reasoned that by typing numbers into his telephone, Smith
voluntarily conveyed the information to his telephone company, and,
in doing so, he assumed the risk that the telephone company would
reveal those numbers to the government.158 This clear cut analysis seems
to suggest that the Court understood the third-party doctrine to be a
bright-line rule: If an individual conveys information to a third party,
then that individual has assumed the risk that the third party will
disclose the information.159
But in the wake of Carpenter, the third-party doctrine’s scope has
become uncertain. In holding that the third-party doctrine does not
apply to CSLI, the Court seems to have created a new test for
determining the doctrine’s application.160 This new test requires courts
to consider: (1) whether the information at issue was voluntarily
exposed; and (2) whether the information was sensitive.161

156. Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter
Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 411, 437 (noting
that the Carpenter Court held that “while each public movement may be
exposed and hence unprotected by Katz, the aggregate of such movements
may qualify for Fourth Amendment protection”); see also Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2217 (“individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the whole of their physical movements”).
157. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
158. Id. at 744.
159. Id. at 743–44.
160. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20.
161. See id.
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The Court gave two reasons for its conclusion that CSLI “is not
truly ‘shared.’”162 First, it noted that “cell phones and the services they
provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that
carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”163
Though the Court did not cite Justice Marshall’s dissent in Smith, its
reasoning is identical: if there is no reasonable alternative, there is no
voluntary choice for the purposes of the third-party doctrine.164 But the
Carpenter Court gave no explanation for distinguishing between
telephone numbers collected by contemporary “pen registers” and
CSLI, which is partially composed of telephone numbers collected by
telephone companies for their business records.165
The second reason the Carpenter Court gave for why CSLI is
involuntarily shared is that CSLI is generated “by dint of [a cell
phone’s] operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user
beyond powering up.”166 The only way to avoid generating CSLI is to
avoid using a cellphone all together.167 But just as “you can[not]
effectively self-regulate to control when or whether you share your
location, without turning your phone off,”168 you cannot prevent your
telephony metadata from being recorded without ceasing to use your
phone for its primary purpose: to call people. It is true that typing a
specific telephone number into a phone is more voluntary than a cell
phone generating a CSLI record when it automatically fetches emails.
The purpose it serves, however, is to allow the Court to avoid
overturning its precedents rather than to either “secure ‘the privacies

162. Id. at 2220.
163. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
164. See supra Part I.C.2; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“[U]nless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many
has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept
the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.”)
(citation omitted).
165. Caminker, supra note 156, at 446 (“[T]he dissents in Miller and Smith
were equally reasonable in claiming that people must use banks and
landlines. The Court in Carpenter offered no reason to distinguish among
these arguable imperatives of daily life, nor thoughts on the comparative
societal necessity of using credit cards, computers, cars, or cardiologists.”)
(footnote omitted).
166. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
167. Id.
168. Caminker, supra note 156, at 446.
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of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’”169 or “place obstacles in the way of a
too permeating police surveillance.”170
In addition to the voluntariness of the exposure, the Carpenter
Court considered the nature of the information sought.171 It reasoned
that “Smith . . . did not rely solely on the act of sharing. Instead, [it]
considered ‘the nature of the particular [information] sought’ to deter–
mine whether ‘there is a legitimate “expectation of privacy” concerning
[its] contents.’”172 As at least one commentator has noted, this assertion
is a forced reading of Smith and its predecessors.173 Nevertheless, the
Court seems to have “injected data sensitivity into the third-party
equation.”174
The Court concluded that CSLI is not subject to the third-party
doctrine because it “is an entirely different species of business record”;175
that is, “[t]here is a world of difference between the limited types of
personal information addressed in Smith . . . and the exhaustive
chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers
today.”176 But due to the close similarities between the CSLI at issue in
Carpenter and the telephone metadata at issue in Smith, this linedrawing is dubious.177 The Court insisted that pen registers have limited
capacity and that “telephone call logs reveal little in the way of
‘identifying information.’”178 The fundamental problem with the Court’s
analysis is that it compared the privacy implications of allowing the
government to collect telephony metadata in the context of 1979’s
datamining technology and CSLI in the context of 2018’s datamining
technology. Had the Court considered telephony metadata in a modern
context, its analysis may well have produced a different outcome.

Conclusion
In Katz, the Court concluded that the trespass doctrine was “no
longer . . . controlling” because it had been “so eroded” by the Court’s
169. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886)).
170. Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
171. Id. at 2219.
172. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
173. See Caminker, supra note 156, at 448.
174. Id.
175. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222.
176. Id. at 2219.
177. See supra Part II.B.1.
178. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
400 (2014)).
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evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.179 Today, over fifty years
after Katz, the Court, despite its insistence to the contrary, finds itself
in a similar position. The government’s technological capabilities and
the Court’s evolving jurisprudence have eroded the basis on which the
majority in Smith v. Maryland concluded that dialed telephone numbers
are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Recognizing the
“seismic shifts in digital technology” that allowed the government to
track Carpenter’s location180—metadata aggregation and analysis—the
Court made significant modifications to then-existing Fourth Amend–
ment doctrine. These modifications should apply to telephony metadata
acquired by the long-term use of modern “pen registers,” bringing them
under the protection of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
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